rates.
2 This "information signaling channel hypothesis" can be seen as nesting the "classical" signaling channel, through which sterilized intervention is effective in providing new information about monetary policy intentions and, if credible, information about future fundamentals. 3 Further, the observation that intervention is occasionally successful may be consistent with the noise trader channel (Hung, 1997) . That is, central bank interventions may work in the presence of so-called "chartists", where positive feedback traders may support a bandwagon movement initially started by central bank intervention.
Empirical studies that are not confined to testing a specific channel through which intervention affects exchange rates are usually more supportive of its effectiveness.
Within the literature using the profitability of intervention as one (perhaps controversial) measure of success, Sweeney (2000) finds that the Fed made, at times, substantial and significant risk-adjusted profits. Using an event study methodology, Fatum and Hutchison (2002) find evidence that intervention affects the exchange rate in the short run. Their findings are broadly consistent with the related work of Catte, Galli and Rebecchini (1994) and the time-series based study of Dominguez and Frankel (1993) .
Although the ECB has only intervened in the exchange market on four occasions in late 2000, the financial press (newswire reports) has picked up numerous rumors of intervention, official statements expressing views regarding the value of the Euro as well as statements by the ECB on the usefulness of intervention. In this context, the objective of this paper is to broadly investigate ECB intervention--the institutional context, the effects of rumors and official statements regarding intervention on daily euro exchange rate movements, and the impact on the markets from the cases where euro-support intervention was confirmed.
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The main contributions of the paper consist of empirical analyses of a unique intervention "news" data set on daily USD/EUR rate movements and an event study on firm reports of ECB intervention. The first analysis is based on time-series study of "news" generated by ECB officials and market participants regarding intervention and the value of the euro. We separate newswire reports into four categories-including official statements, market rumors and firm reports of intervention--and measure what type of news has systematically moved the exchange rate. We also undertake a detailed case study, using an event-study methodology, on the four occurrences of euro intervention acknowledged by the ECB. Consistent with the findings of Frenkel,
Pierdzioch and Stadtman (2001), both analyses provide some support for the short-run efficacy of ECB intervention operations in support of the euro, but the effects are not long lasting. Interestingly, we find that "negative" statements by ECB officials questioning the efficacy of intervention, denying past intervention, and ruling out future intervention, have systematically depreciated the euro and the effect appears persistent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the institutional framework within which ECB foreign exchange market intervention policy is formulated. Section 2 presents the empirical work linking USD/EUR exchange rate changes to "news" (newswire reports) relating to intervention and official statements about the euro. Section 3 presents the event study methodology applied to the USD/EUR intervention. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Institutional Framework and Intervention Policy in the EU
Since the inception of the Euro on January 1, 1999, the ECB intervened in the USD/EUR The ECB also has a great deal of discretion over intervention policy. Article 2 ("Objectives and Tasks of the ESCB") of the Constitution of the European System of Central Banks states that "…the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability" and that, without prejudice to price stability, it shall support the general economic policies of the EU. Foreign exchange market intervention policy is addressed under "External Operations" (Article 23) where it is noted that the ECB and national central banks may:
• establish relations with central banks and financial institutions in other countries and, where appropriate, with international organizations; • acquire and sell spot and forward all types of foreign exchange assets and precious metals; the term foreign exchange asset' shall include securities and all other assets in the currency of any country or units of account and in whatever form held;
• hold and manage the assets referred to in this Article;
• conduct all types of banking transactions in relations with third countries and international organizations, including borrowing and lending operations. between the ECB and other EU institutions and foreign government officials. The coordinated intervention operation on September 22, for example, followed a meeting on September 8-9 of the euro-group ministers (finance ministers of EU countries participating in EMU) in Versailles where support for a strong rather than stable euro was a key element in the official meeting statement.
News and the Euro
Applying the efficient markets hypothesis to foreign exchange, a large literature has investigated the impact of "news" on exchange rate changes. The basic idea is that "news", by definition, must be unanticipated information-and this information, in turn, might have value in revising expectations over current or future exchange rate fundamentals. Early studies linking press reports ("news") .and exchange rate movements include Engel and Frankel (1984) and Ito and Roley (1987 Our objective is to investigate whether statements and rumors of this nature reported in the press, either favorable or unfavorable to the Euro, are systematically related to USD/EUR exchange rate changes. Four types of news reports are extracted from the financial press and dated to the point they were reported over the newswires.
The Wall Street Journal was searched in detail over the January 1, 1999 to To the extent that the categories A to D represent "news", we would expect categories A, B and D to be associated with an appreciation of the Euro and category C to be associated with a depreciation of the Euro.
We test these hypotheses within the following framework:
where ∆lnS is the change in the natural logarithm of the USD/EUR exchange rate (daily noon quote in New York), and X is the vector of contemporaneous and lagged "news" The model estimates reported in column 3, using the combined measure of favorable news (ABD), again finds that unfavorable news (variable C) immediately depreciates the euro (with the same magnitude and significance level as in column 1).
The combined measure of favorable news is positive and significant at just under the 90 percent level of confidence.
On balance, our results indicate that official statements denying ECB intervention (past, present or future) or the efficacy of intervention (variable C) have apparently been viewed as important "news" and worked to depreciate the value of the euro. This effect is persistent over a week at least 6 . Rumors and speculation of intervention in support of the euro (variable A) is associated with euro appreciation, but the effect is not persistent. By contrast, the market apparently ignored official statements in support of the euro (variable B). There is some evidence that firm reports of eurosupport intervention (variable D) had an impact-the few instances of these reports, however, occurring on only 4 out of 751 business days, may explain why stronger support for the efficacy of official intervention was not found. This is the motivation for the event study of the next section.
An Event Study Methodology Applied to Euro Intervention
The foundation of an event study is the definition of the event of interest and the identification of the period over which -in this context -the exchange rate movements are examined. This period is referred to as the event window and it is comprised of the pre-event days (sometimes referred to as the estimation window), the event day (or days), and the post-event days. We apply three criteria to determine or define what characterizes a successful event. The first criterion is simply based on whether the direction of the subsequent exchange rate movement is the same as the direction in which the central bank was intervening, e.g. does the value of the euro relative to the dollar increase after euros are purchased? The second criterion defines a successful event as one where intervention is associated with a smoothing of the exchange rate movement, i.e. an event is deemed successful if it is either successful according to the direction criterion or the subsequent exchange rate movement is smaller ("smoother") than the exchange rate movement preceding the central bank intervention. Our third criterion distinguishes between "leaning with the wind" and "leaning against the wind" events by conditioning each event on the exchange rate movement of the associated pre-event window. This measure is denoted the "reversal" criteria. Applying the event study methodology to the firm reports of euro intervention (variable D), two separate events emerge -a one-day event on September 22 and a 3-day event spanning from November 3 through 9 (both events in 2000). Table 2 shows the exchange rate movements around the two events for the associated pre-and post-event windows for window lengths of 2, 5, 10 and 15 days.
The first part of the case study of euro intervention focuses on the intervention policy of the central banks. With respect to the intervention policy pursued by the central banks participating in the first event, it is not surprising that for the longer window lengths it appears consistent with a "leaning against the wind" intervention policy, given the history of a sustained downward trend in the value of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar.
However, it is interesting to notice that based on the shortest window length, the 2-day window, the intervention policy is described as "leaning with the wind", thereby lending some anecdotal support to the view that central banks prefer to intervene "with" the market in the short run even if the purpose of intervention is to break or "lean against" a long run trend. 
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The second event of euro intervention appears consistent with a "leaning with the wind" policy when looking at the 2, 5 and 10-day pre-event windows, while consistent with a "leaning against the wind" policy when looking at the 15-day pre-event window. Again, with reference to the sustained euro depreciation since its inception in January 1999, this suggests a central bank that is timing its intervention operations such that it intervenes "with" the market in the short run.
The second part of the euro intervention study employs the previously defined criteria -"direction", "reversal", and "smoothing" -in order to evaluate the successfulness of the two events. 10 The evaluation of successfulness is summarized in table 3. Focusing on the first event, it appears successful according to all three criteria (when applicable) when the analysis is based on the shorter window lengths. When the analysis is based on the longer window lengths, the September 22 event appears unsuccessful with respect to maintaining an exchange rate level effect (the "direction"
and the "reversal" criteria), while it remains successful with respect to the "smoothing"
criterion. Although the analysis of intra-event exchange rate movements is beyond the scope of the applied event study methodology, it is worthwhile pointing out that the spike in the value of the euro on the day of the September 22 intervention was transitory. In fact, 16 business days after the first event of euro intervention, the exchange rate had reverted to a level below its level on September 21, the day immediately preceding the event. This observation further emphasizes that the effects of intervention appear shortterm.
11
Turning to the second event (which is classified as a "leaning with the wind" event with respect to all but the 15-day window length, thus only the "direction" criterion is meaningful for the analysis based on the 2, 5, and 10-day windows) a similar pattern prevails, i.e. the November 3 through 9 event appears successful when the analysis is based on the shorter window lengths. When the analysis is based on the 10-day window, the event appears unsuccessful. With respect to the 15-day window length, however, this event appears successful according to all three criteria.
Rather than concluding that the second event was associated with lasting level as well as smoothing effects on the exchange rate, it seems likely that the explanation lies elsewhere. The event study methodology implicitly assumes that intervention defines the event and the exchange rate movements during the pre-and post-event windows are unrelated to other economic news. In this case, the longer the window length, the more likely it seems that what drives the euro appreciation is the turmoil surrounding the US presidential election counts and recounts in Florida and the widespread selling of dollar assets in anticipation of a prolonged gridlock.
Conclusion
This paper makes two main contributions. The first contribution is a time-series analysis of "news" generated by ECB officials and market participants regarding intervention and the value of the euro. We find that either official statements denying ECB intervention (past, present or future) or questioning the efficacy of intervention have apparently been viewed as important "news" and worked to depreciate the value of the euro. This effect is persistent over a week at least. The contrary is not the case, however: the market apparently ignored official statements in support of the euro. Firm reports of intervention, as well as rumors and speculation of intervention in support of the euro, are associated with short-term euro appreciation.
The second contribution is a detailed case study, using an event study methodological approach, on the effects of the four confirmed cases of ECB intervention.
Based on all three alternative criteria of success, the first event (September 22, 2000)
15 appears successful when the analysis is based on relatively short window lengths.
However, the results are mixed when longer window lengths are considered. A similar pattern emerges in the analysis of the second event (three occurrences of intervention in November 2000).
On balance, both methodological approaches support the view that ECB intervention has been successful in the short run. Interestingly, only "negative" statements by ECB officials (questioning the efficacy of intervention and denying that they have intervened or will intervene) appear to both immediately depreciate the euro value and have a persistent effect. (2000) and Humpage (1999) .
Notes
3 See Fatum and Hutchison (1999) for a direct test of the "classical" signaling channel.
The theoretical justification offered by the "portfolio balance" channel, through which sterilized intervention changes the currency denomination of relative asset supplies and thereby the exchange risk premium if assets are imperfect substitutes, has received little empirical support (see, for example, Edison (1993) ). 4 In terms of independence of instructions from government bodies, for example, the ECSB statute states: "…neither the ECB nor a national central bank nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any government or a member state or from any other body." (Article 7).
As Gros and Thygesen (1998) point out, this wording supporting independence of instructions is more explicit than even the Bundesbank. . 6 The evidence that "bad" news has a strong and more persistent effect on the market is consistent with the results of Galati and Ho (2001) relating to macroeconomic news.
7 See MacKinlay (1997) for a survey on event study methodology.
8 Given that the market may have expected coordinated intervention and statements in support of the euro on the following day at the G7 Meeting, another explanation for the exact timing of the Sep. 22 event is that the central banks wanted to surprise the foreign exchange market (keeping in mind that no previous intervention in the USD/EUR exchange rate had been carried out). 9 The 15-day pre-event window associated with the second event overlaps with the 15-day post-event window associated with the first event, thus the characterization of the intervention policy for the second event based on the 15-day window length is only indicative.
10 If the exchange rate change during the associated pre-event window is an appreciation, i.e. the event appears consistent with a "leaning with the wind" policy, the "reversal" and "smoothing" criteria are not meaningful and the evaluation of successfulness not applicable.
11 See Fatum (2000) for an overview of intra-event DEM/USD exchange rate movements during the post-Plaza period. a) OLS regressions corrected for heteroskedasticity (using White's standard errors). Standard errors in parentheses; *** denotes significance at the 99% level, ** denotes significance at the 95% level, * denotes significance at the 90% level. Official data regarding the magnitude of ECB intervention operations is unavailable.
Estimates found in the financial press suggest that central banks bought euros in the amount of 6 billion dollar on September 22 and that the ECB subsequently bought euros in a total amount of 3 billion dollar during the early November event. c)
Average daily percentage change in the EUR/USD exchange rate over the two, five, ten and fifteen business days, respectively, succeeding the last day of the event. Table 3 Successfulness Intervention is successful if the purchase of euro is associated with a subsequent appreciation of the euro. If the exchange rate change during the associated pre-event window is an appreciation of the euro, i.e. the intervention policy appears as "leaning with the wind" for the given window length, this criterion is not meaningful and the evaluation of successfulness is denoted n.a. 
